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1. Introduction  
Keynesian economics since The General 
Theory revealed one fundamental error of 
classical economics that equilibria in a 
capitalist economy can persist but with 
high involuntary unemployment. But also 
Keynes showed that aggregate demand 
play crucial role in determining the output 
and employment. Keynesian economics it 
is said that violates the assumptionthat 
good economics is conditioned by, and 
that is the notion that microeconomic 
foundation are based on perfectly rational 
economic agents, Akerlof, Yelen 
(1980)
1
.During the decade of 1960’s and 
1970’s Keynesians have struggled to 
formulate micro foundations for their 
Keynesian models and they were relaxing 
the Walrasian assumptions by introducing 
market imperfections such asasymmetric 
informations,Akerlof(1970)
2
,Stiglitz(1976)
3
,staggered contracts,Taylor(1980)
4
, 
transaction cost theories  papers such as:                             
                                                     
1Akerlof, George A &Yellen, Janet L, (1987). "Rational Models 
of Irrational Behavior," American Economic Review, 
American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 137-42, May 
2Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, 
August. 
3 M. Rothschild, J. E. Stiglitz: "Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 1976, 629–
649. 
  
4Taylor,B.,J.,(1980), Aggregate dynamics and staggered 
contracts, The journal of political economy ,Vol.88 
Baumol(1952)
5
,Tobin(1956)
6
.Now, in the 
following sections of the paper are 
explained some of the new-keynesian 
economics tale along with some proofs. . 
 
2. Interest rate consumption 
income and savings  
A representative consumer maximizes: 
 ucte
dt (1) 
Subject to 
a = y + ra − c, a(0) is givenwhere y and 
rare constant through time, y is perishable 
output, and a represents a stock of interest-
bearing real financial assets. We do not 
necessarilyimpose that the subjective 
discount rate δis equal to the market real 
interest rate r. A no-Ponzi condition also is 
imposed on the problem. This means that 
for a consumer with a market discount 
factor ρ we have the following budget 
constraint: 
)(
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5Baumol, William J., (1952), “The Transactions 
Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic 
Approach”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 
vol. 66, pp. 545–556. 
6Tobin, James, (1956), “The Interest Elasticity of the 
Transactions Demand for Cash”, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, August, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 241–247. 
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This corresponds to a period budget 
constraint and no –ponzi condition of 
form: 
C ≤ Y − β
ρ
B
 + B(3) 
lim"→ Eβ"ρ%"B%"(4) 
For the isoelastic function we have  
uc = &'(
'
)


')
(5)y and r , are constant 
through time 
Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
H = uc + λy + ra − c(6) 
First order conditions are: 
,-
,& = u.c − λ = 0(7) 
λ = λδ − ,-,& = λδ − r(8) 
0 = lim→ e
 λtat(9) 
First derivative of consumption is: 
u.c = c
/1(10) 
The last equation can be written as:  
u..cc = u′cδ − r(11) 
Or as  
&
& = 
3
4&
&344& δ − r = σr − δ(12) 
The solution for linear differential 
equation describing consumption path is: 
ct = c0e16
(13) 
integrating a(0) , and imposing no-ponzi 
condition preventing unlimited debt, the 
intertemporal budget constraint is : 
a0 =  ct − ye
6dt (14) 
if we substitute the equation for ct in the 
last equation than we need to solve the 
equation: 
a0 =  7c0e16
 − y8e
6dt (15) 
 
c0 = 9%:
;
<=
 7>)<(?@8>(<@ABC
= 9%:
;
<=
 >)<(?@(<@ABC
=
9%:;<=
16

('D>)<(?@(<@|CBF = σδ −
σ − 1r Ha0 + :I6=J(16) 
 
The assumption thatσ − 1r − σδ =
σr − δ < 0, lim→ e16

6 = 0 
Looking at the preceding consumption 
function, we see the three ways a rise in 
the interest rate r will affect saving: 
The marginal propensity to consume out of 
total wealth is σδ − σ − 1r   : When r 
rises, that coefficient falls with an effect 
proportional to σ. This is the substitution 
effect.The substitution effect is 
counteracted by an effect proportional to 
unity that tends to make σδ − σ − 1r   to 
rise when r rises. This is the income effect. 
The coefficient σ − 1in the marginal 
propensity σδ − σ − 1r captures the 
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balance between the substitution and 
income effects. In addition, y/r falls when r 
rises - there is a fall in lifetime wealth and 
so consumption falls. This is the wealth 
effect.  
 
3. Modigliani –Miller theorem  
 
Firms raise capital by issuing debt as well 
as equity too. So the firm can issue equity 
shares E, and bonds B, to finance its 
investment in capital K. Forms can find 
itself in two states S, and in two periods. 
The payoff to the investment tomorrow is 
AsFKfors ∈ S. For simplicity 
assumption of depreciation of capital is 
thatδ = 1. Risk free interest rate on the 
markets is, firms borrowing rate is rS. The 
firm will owe to its bondholders 1 + rSB 
in every state but the bankruptcy states are 
given as ST and non-bankruptcy states are 
given asSUT. And the total set of states is 
the one that consists of bankruptcy and 
non-bankruptcy statesS = ST ∪ SUT. When 
in bankruptcy, the total output of the firm 
is insufficient to cover debt payments; 
sosFK < 1 + rSB . In this case 
bondholders are senior claimants and get 
whatever there it is while equity holders 
get nothing. 
equity holder payoff
= {∀^∈^_`abc
%6ST ∀ ^∈^d_ 
bond holder payoff = {`abc∀^∈^_%6ST ∀ ^∈^d_ 
The value of the equity of the firm is given 
as: 
E = ∑ ha`abc
%6ST %6^∈^d_ = K − B                                                                        
(17)  
In order lenders to get the same rate of 
return as they would in risk free lending 
we can write; 
∑ ha%6ST%6^∈^d_ + ∑ h
a`^bc
%6^∈^_ = B                                                                      
(18) 
1 + rS = T
∑
ijklmn
'o<j∈l_
∑ ij'o<S_'o<l∈ld_
(19) 
 
V = E + B = ∑ ha`^bc
%6ST%6a∈^d_ +
∑ ha%6ST%6^∈^d_ + ∑ h
a`^bc
%6^∈^_ =
∑ ha`^bc%6 = K^∈^                                                              
(20) 
Previous expression is the basic 
Modigliani-Miller theorem, the firm’s 
market value is simply the value of its 
outputs across future states of nature.  The 
division of claims between equity and debt 
is irrelevant. Also, this theorem is 
irrelevant for the investment rule, i.e. 
investment rule is unaffected by the mode 
of finance, debt or equity. The Tobin’s q is 
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more sophisticated it assumes that capital 
is costly to install. Key assumption of the 
model is that there exist convex 
installation costs 
q
r Ir K⁄ . This are the 
cost that incur for the installing the new 
capital. So, therefore firm’s discounted 
profit stream at date t can be presented: 
Πt =  e
6a
AsFvKs, Lsy −
wsLs − Is − qr Isr /Ksds           
(21) 
The last expression is maximized subject 
to constraint, K s = Is.The interest rate 
is assumed to be constant. Hamiltonian for 
this case is: 
H = AFK, L − wL − I − qr Ir K⁄  + qI                                                                       
(22) 
We differentiate with respect to the two 
controls setting the result to zero, to 
obtain: 
AF{K, L = w 
|
c = }
q (23) 
  
Investment is positive when the value of 
installed capital exceeds the replacement 
cost.  
q − rq = − ,-,c(24) 
That is by: 
q − rq = −AFcK, L − qr I K⁄ r(25) 
Dynamic equations of the model can be 
written as: 
q − rq = −AFcK, L~ − }
rq                                                                                
(26) 
K = :}
q = K(27) 
The steady state of the models incur where 
q~ = 1 and AFcK, L = r.Now, the general 
solution for a constant interest rate is given 
as: 
qt =  e
6AFcvKs, Lsy +
q
r  |
a
cards + be6  (28) 
Where we have made substitution  
}

rq = qr : |c=
r
(29) 
The economically relevant solution 
imposes the transversality condition: 
lim→ e
6qtKt = 0(30) 
Which obliges us to set b=0 in that case: 
qt =  e
6AFcvKs, Lsy +
q
r  |
a
cards(31) 
This way defined is marginal q, the 
relationship between average and marginal 
q I given this way: 
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A}c
A = qK + q K = rqK :AFcK + q|

rc= +
qI = rqK − HAFK, L − wL + q|rcJ +
I :1 + χ |c= = rqK − HAFK, L − wL −
I − χ |rcJ(32) 
Imposing the transversality condition  
qtKt =  e
6a
 HAsFKs, Ls −
wsLs − Is − qr |
a
caJ ds = Πt 
(33) 
From the previous expression one can see 
that marginal q and average q are equal 
i.e.: 
q = c .(34) 
4. Miller-Orr model  
This is inventory model of the demand for 
money. Following Miller &Orr (1966)
7
 
model and Baumol(1952) and Tobin 
(1956), now generalizing Irving Fischer, 
Akerlof (1969)
8
, lets demand for money to 
be written as: 
L = LP, S(35) 
Where P are autonomous payment flows, 
actually P is a vector of probabilities of 
nonzero autonomous payments, S is 
                                                     
7Miller, M. & Orr, D. (1966). A model of the demand for 
money by firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81, 413-
435 
8Akerlof, George A, 1979. Irving Fisher on His Head: The 
Consequences of Constant Threshold-Target Monitoring of 
Money Holdings, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT 
Press, vol. 93(2), pages 169-87, May. 
representing policies whereby bank 
accounts are monitored, or S are the 
monitoring rules whereby banks are 
monitored to have them prevented of them 
having too high or too low balance. Irving 
Fischer S, is a vector of time intervals that 
present average lag which purchases 
follow autonomous receipts in different 
banks. In the standard monetarist theory of 
Irving Fisher persons receive money on 
their bank accounts. The flows are 
proportional to income.  
L = LY, ,6, , S(36) 
In the previous expression Y denotes 
aggregate income, r is the rate of interest 
and E is the vector of aggregate 
expenditures, the probabilities of non-zero 
transactions depend on income, interest 
rate and expenditures so: P =
PY, E, r.Most theories on demand for 
money state: 
L = LPY, SY, r(37) 
S in the previous expression is the 
monitoring rule. If the monitoring rule is 
constant and income changes, the demand 
for money will change proportionately. 
The implication is that short run demand 
for money is proportional to income, so 
this will make LM curve vertical in the 
short run so shifts in IS curve have no 
effect on equilibrium. We can modify 
Miller &Orr model so that : 
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p + q + s = 1(38) 
Where p is probability of getting one 
dollar, q is probability of losing one dollar, 
s is the probability of no transition. So, 
that expected value of autonomous 
payments and expected value of induced 
payments is zero. First let’s consider the 
distribution of money holdings: 
f|p, q, s, h, z(39) 
f(x) is dependent only on p/q, h and z. One 
can find this by setting f(x,t) = p f(x-1, t-1) 
+ sf(x,t-1), + qf(x+1, t-1) . Now if we 
denote long run demand for money as m∗, 
and demand for money in the previous 
period as m
. So that m is the geometric 
mean of real money balances. This means 
that: 
m = m∗m

(40) 
Suppose that long run demand for money 
depends upon income and interest: 
m∗ = y9 + r
(41) 
 
Where in the previous expression m∗ is the 
L-R demand, a is the L-R income elasticity 
of demand, βis the L-R interest elasticity 
of demand. Then we can write like: 
m = y9r9m

(42) 
And if we put the previous expression in 
logarithm: 
lnm = aγlnY − βγlnr + 1 − ylnm
                                                        
(43) 
In the previous expression γ is the rate of 
adjustment, aγ represents short run income 
elasticity of the demand, βγ is the short-
run elasticity of the demand, a represents 
long-run income elasticity of the demand, 
β represents long run interest elasticity of 
the demand. Ignoring the constant term 
one can write following equation: 
lnm = αγ ∑ 1 − γ lny
 −
βγ ∑ 1 − γlnr
                                
(44) 
Now, the level of investment is the 
constant fraction of the deviation of the 
capital stock from the optimum: 
I = K − K
 = αK∗ − K
(45) 
In the previous expression K∗ is some 
function, let us say of income, the cost of 
capital, and maybe cost of labor. 
Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger 
(1997)
9
, call the deviation from desired 
capital stock from actual “mandated 
investment”. In the previous expression 
K∗ − K
 is the mandated investment. If 
the fraction of investment gap between 
K∗ − K
 is namedAx, in other words 
                                                     
9 Caballero, Ricardo J & Engel, Eduardo M R A &Haltiwanger, 
John, (1997). Aggregate Employment Dynamics: Building 
from Microeconomic Evidence, American Economic Review, 
American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), and pages 115-37, 
March. 
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the investment rate of the firm than will 
be: 
|
c = Axxor 
I =  Axfxdx(46)Proportional money 
supply is  p∗ , and this proportional money 
supplyp∗ = , also p∗ is the long run 
optimal price, and the loss of non-setting 
the optimal price is: 
kp − p ∗r(47) 
Let’s suppose that there is fixed costs of 
changing price, denoted a .Now, let’s 
suppose that log of the money supply 
follows random walk. With, probability ½ 
the gap p-p* rises by 1. And with 
probability ½ p-p* falls by 1. Than the 
optimal policy has upper threshold: p*+U 
at which p is set to equal its target value 
p*. A, symmetric lower threshold is: p*-U. 
So, an optimal cash policy according to 
Miller and Orr (1966)
10
, will ask for an 
investment in a periodical receipts in the 
earning assets followed by regular timed 
sequence of security transfers   
5. Issues in monetary policy  
In general central government has 
monopoly power to issue money, and also 
this privilege is a source of revenue. Now, 
if the private sector is willing to hold paper 
money that the government supplies, the 
                                                     
10 Miller, M.,Orr,D.,(2000), Amodel of the demand for money 
by firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
government can buy real goods and 
services that the private sector produces 
with money that is costless for government 
top print. Money that is not backed by 
some real commodity are called fiat 
money. The real resources that government 
acquires by printing fiat money are equal 
to its seigniorage revenue. To define the 
seignoriage, we first need to know why the 
private sector is willing to accept the 
government’s fiat money, all that matters 
is that there is demand for it. Seigniorage 
in period t is given by the expression: 
@
@('
@ (49) 
From the last expression one can see that 
real resources that government acquires 
through increases in the nominal money 
balances the public is willing to hold. A 
useful way to rewrite this is to write: 
 
@
@('
@ = πm
 + m − m
(50) 
In the previous expression π = @
@('@  , 
and money demand is m =   , this 
expression emphasizes two distinct 
sources of seigniorage. First, the inflation 
tax, the amount people must give to the 
government to hold their real money 
balances constant in that face of rising 
prices. Second, it is the public desire to 
alter its real money holdings, given the 
inflation rate. Seigniorage at time t is: 
9 
 
 
 
 = πtmt + m t(51) 
We observe that seigniorage need not to 
equal the inflation. In the classic 
application of the interrelatedness between 
seigniorage and monetary policy by 
Sargent and Walace (1981)
11
, it is said that 
monetary base is closely connected to the 
inflation, represented by the price level, 
and that the monetary authority can raise 
seignorage, by which is meant revenues 
from creation of money. We know the 
following identity:i = r + π, i.e. that 
nominal interest rate equals real plus the 
inflation, so one can solve: 
A
A πmr + π = 0(52) 
The last expression yields the following 
result: 
 + . = 0(53) 
 
Or this can be rewritten: 
− 4 = 1(54) 
From the last formula one can point out to 
the money demand curve where the 
inflation elasticity is 1. This is standard 
formula that instruct us to look at money 
demand curve where the inflation elasticity 
is 1. And also standard formula where 
marginal costs of producing money equals 
                                                     
11Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall. 
to marginal revenue from creating it. 
Nominal money supply M is not changed 
at time t=0 when  rises.  
m.i = AA = 
 AA = −  AA m(55) 
The equation for the total discounted 
seigniorage revenue reduces to: 
 e
6m + πm′idt (56) 
 This solution is somewhat problematic 
because it entails an unexpected 
expropriation of private sector wealth to: 


A
 m(57) 
Let’s suppose that the government has 
promised to avoid surprise changes in the 
value of real balances, so in such a case 
small rise in inflation would rise 
government seigniorage revenue by: 
m.i +  e
6m + πm′idt (58)  
 
The reason to ensure dP = 0 when 
inflation rises, the government must reduce 
the nominal supply sharply, it might 
finance this loss in seigniorage by selling 
bonds, and it cannot finance it by a 
surprise inflation tax on the private sector 
as before. If we set the last expression to 
be equal to zero one can find that: 
m.i + %.6 = 0(59) 
Or after the simplification: 
− . = 1(60) 
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This is the solution which sets interest 
elasticity of the demand for money to be 
equal to 1. Now, if the initial private 
money balances are  m, and initial price 
level, at different levels of . Now, one can 
find that: 
 e
6imidt − m (61) 
And the economy wide resource constraint 
one can set by the following formulation: 
f0 =  e
6ct + gt − ytdt                                                                       
(62) 
this constraint comes from the fact that 
domestic money is not held by foreigners, 
and domestic residents hold no money 
issued by foreign governments.  
6. Baumol-Tobin model 
Baumol-Tobin model is and economic 
model of transaction demand
12
,this model 
was developed by Baumol(1952),and 
Tobin (1956). Later was extended by 
Jovanovic(1982)
13
 and Romer (1986). 
First,one can start by using the utility 
function from Romer (1987)
14
 
U =  lnc t" dt − an(63) 
                                                     
12
Transaction demand in Keynesian economics is one of the 
determinants of the demand for money. 
13
Jovanovic, Boyan, (1982), “Inflation and Welfare in the 
Steady State”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 90, no. 3, 
pp. 561–577. 
 
14Romer,D.,(1987), The monetary transmission mechanism in 
a general equilibrium version of the Tobin-Baumol model, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 20(1987 
In the previous expression capital letter T 
is the life time of the consumer, C(t) is the 
consumption at some age t, that lies in the 
interval between 0 and T. Also,  is the 
interval between withdrawals money from 
bank  ∈ 0, . While, n is the total 
number of conversions of bank deposits 
into money that individual makes 
throughout his life time. Now in the 
equilibrium model one must introduce 
inflation  and interest rate  .Now, 
if the nominal interest rate is constant the 
number of trips to the bank would be given 
as per this expression: 
τ = r9 (64) 
But if one solves the utility function will 
get following result: 
U = Tlnct − an(65)                        
Higher inflation on the other hand makes it 
more costly one to hold money, so the real 
money balances are reduced by an increase 
in frequency in which people convert their 
capital into money.   
¡¢
¡ < 0(66) 
Real money balances are equal to = £̅ − ¥ 
, where m are real money balances or 

¦ , £̅ 
represents the capital that has been bought 
¥ represents the cost of marketing the 
capital. This marketing cost in Jovanovic 
(1982) model represents same as 
11 
 
brokerage fee in Tobin and Baumol 
models. Otherwise government expands or 
shrinks the money supply by constant rate 
 ,the period during which an individual is 
using his real money balances is  . Now 
let: 
m = cm, π, τ  e§§ dt(67) 
now when solving the integral  e§§ dt 
with replacing u = πτ and du = πdτ or 
A3
 = dτ,and if one replace  e3§  du we 
can simplify so that  >¨ dunow the result 
from last expression is 
>¨
  , now if one 
replace u = πτand solves for >©ª + C , and 
with upper minus lower bound the result is 
>©ª

  . And now one can write: 
 = «, ,  ¬­®
 (68) 
or: 
«, ,  = ¬­®
(69) 
so when inflation is  > 0,inflation erodes 
purchasing power parity of money and so 
«, ,  < ¢ (70) 
Inflation also is greater or equal to the 
negative rate of time preferences 
 ≥ −(71) 
The brokers fee that individual pays for 
withdrawal of assets is given as 
±²
³  ,and if 
he holds cash his annual interest cost than 
will be 
³
r .Now in order to find minimal 
costs in order individual to pay for his we 
apply first derivative with respect to c on 
±²
³ + ³r  
− ±²³ + r = 0(72) 
or of one simplifies for c in the last 
expression one can get: 
« = r±² (73) 
or either way the  general solution in the 
inventory models for demand of money is 
given by the expression, 
Baumol,Tobin(1989)
15
: 
´
9µ =  ¢¶r·¸(74) 
Now for a micro-foundations of the 
previous equation. Here shortly will be 
introduced the model by Miguel 
Sidrauski(1968)
16
.This model is about 
individual household utility ,total welfare 
of the family is given by : 
W =  º«», » ¼
·»½(75) 
                                                     
15Baumol, William J. and Tobin, James (1989), "The Optimal 
Cash Balance Proposition: Maurice Allais' Priority", Journal 
of Economic Literature, September, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 1160–
1162. 
16Sidrauski, Miguel (May 1967). "Rational Choice and Patterns 
of Growth in a Monetary Economy". American Economic 
Review 57 (2): 534–544. 
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The previous equation input can be 
presented as: 
¾ =  ¿³À,À¬ÁÀ ½76or: 
 º«», » ¼
·»½ = ¿³À,À· 77 
The last expression means that wealth of 
households depends on utility 
proportionally, but it decreases as 
subjective time preferences of the family 
grow. Utility depends on real money 
balances. The following identity it has 
been imposed: 
ÄÅ» + Æ» = «» + Ç»(78) 
ÄÅ»is the homogenous output that is 
produced by the capital stock,Æ» are the 
government transfers,«» + Ç» is the real 
consumption plus gross real savings. Rate 
of time preferences can be presented by 
the following equation
17
: 
¼
·¸ = 1 − È(79) 
And the interval between trips to bank  
can be presented by the following 
formulation: 
 = ²¸% = r· (80)Which is the 
expression that previously has been 
derived. Now consumer spends in different 
ages of his life time. The utility 
maximization principle requires that at the 
                                                     
17
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margin individual is indifferent whether he 
or she will spend at to or at some later time 
t, i.e.  <  <  , individual withdraw 
money at t0 and spends it at t1.  
É.&C
hC =
É.&
h (81) 
In the previous expression p, represents the 
nominal price of the consumption good. In 
this version output can be written as in 
usual way = ÊÅ , and the usual 
assumptions here hold that Ê′∙ > 0 
,Ê..∙ < 0, Ê′0 = ∞ and Ê′′∞ = 0. 
The real interest rate is Í = Ê′Å. The 
wage is Î = Ä − ÍÅ. Now if W is the 
individual wealth or that is ¾ = Î + Ï, 
where is the initial Endowment that person 
receives at his/hers birth and S are the 
lump sum transfers that individual receives 
throughout his/hers lifetime. And,w = Ð" , 
or w = %^" , consumption also at age t is 
given by the expression: 
ct = we6Ñ§e
§
Ñ§(82) 
In the previous expression Ò is the time 
interval where jτ <  < Ò + 1 , last 
expression implies abot the contribution of 
generations to the total consumption: 
CÑ = "  we6Ñ§e
§
Ñ§dt =Ñ%§

"

>(©ª
 ¼ÔÕ»Ö(83) 
The total consumption 
isC = ∑ CÑ =µÑ H
>(©ª J H>
<×

>ª

§
"J w , and 
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for = ØÔ H¢² ¬
ÙÚ

¬ÙÚ
 − 1J , now substituting the 
last two expressions in : 

"  Ctdt = " + r ""  Ktdt" (84) 
One can get 
w = %^" = §
>(©ª "(85) 
Now in the extension Romer inserts 
government in the model. Government can 
inject money not by transferring to 
individuals but by purchasing goods. So, 
now the extension of the models looks a 
like this: 
G = " + r "  Ktdt − "  Ctdt"" (86) 
In this economy there are no lump sum 
transfer sow = " , and equilibrium life 
time endowments can be presented such 
as: 
w ∗= "  Wte
6dt" (87) 
Aggregate money holdings between ages 
jτ and j + 1τ are: 
mÑ =  WÑ Ñ%§
§Ñ%§Ñ§ e

Ñ§dt =
WÕ ¬(­®%¢
¢                                                 
(88) 
In general Romer (1986) version, is 
general equilibrium model, where one can 
see and study money demand, the effect on 
inflation on consumption the optimum 
quantity of money.  
7. Financial instability and 
Diamond-Dybvig model  
In the Diamond-Dybvig model (1983)
18
 
banks as financial intermediaries promote 
risk sharing among individuals, but also 
they are subject of intermediary panics. 
Authors at first explain that bank runs are 
common feature of extreme crises in 
monetary history. In the model there are 
three periods, i.e. T = 1,2,3. Also there are 
two existing and possible technologies. 
Investment of one unit of output at T=0, 
yields one unit of output in period 0 and 
one unit of output in period 2. This is 
when one uses short technology to 
produce, but when one uses long 
technology to produce at T=0, this yields 0 
units of output in period one and more 
than one r>1 units in period 2. Individuals 
need not to specify the technology that 
they are using or exante choosing. The 
idea is that more roundabout technologies 
are more productive. They opt for a short 
run or long run technology depending on 
the harvesting of yield in period 1 or 
period 2. There exist two types of utility 
functions: 
Uc; cr; 1 = Uc(89) 
Uc; cr; 2 = Uc + cr(90) 
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In the previous expression 
lim³⟶ à.« = ∞and lim³⟶ à.« =
0; − ³á44³á4³ > 1. The person will choose 
« = 1 if turns out to be impatient and 
«r = Í if patient. Expected or average 
utility of that person is given by the 
following expression: 
EU = pu1 + 1 − pur)(91) 
So, agents (people) can do better than this 
if there are intermediaries. And, now some 
benevolent social planner would withdraw 
1-x from the investment on T=1, so as to 
maximize the expected utility of a 
representative individual.  
puc + 1 − pucr + crr(92) 
Previous expression is subject to resource 
constraint: 
pc + 1 − pcr = 1 − x(93) 
1 − pcr = rx 
In the previous expression in general «Õ 
are the resources that type i consumes in 
period j. It is always optimal that «r = 0. 
Now the simpler problem to maximize is 
given by: 
max&'',& âà« + 1 − pucrr(94) 
The last expression is being maximized 
subject to: 
pc + 1 − p v&'yÔ = 1(95) 
and if ã is the Lagrangian,the first order 
conditions for maximization are given by 
the expression: 
à.« = ã 
à.«rr = ã/Í(96) 
à.«
à.«rr = Í 
The budget constraint of the social planner 
is given by the following expression: 
«rr = Ô
¦ − ¦Ô
¦ «(97) 
Now, there are banks in our economy as 
they exist in reality too. Let’s consider that 
there exists bank contracts. Such a contract 
so that everyone deposits their resources in 
the bank at time T=0.So, those that are 
patient people can withdraw money Í > 1 
in period 1. Their withdrawals will be 
monitored by the bank. Patient depositors 
will get their pro rata of what is left after 
period one withdrawal. Banks will 
implement social optimum Í = «∗ , 
where in the previous expression asterisk 
denotes social optimum. But some fraction 
of the depositors, those impatient will 
withdraw money at period, then the patient 
consume balance 
Ôv
¦³''∗y

¦ = «rr∗. Now, 
lets suppose that V1 is the payoff one gets 
when one withdraws in period one, V2 is 
the payoff that one gets in period two if 
one does not withdraw in period one. 
15 
 
Because the payoff depends on the place 
one has in the line, if fjdenotes the number 
of the depositors served before depositor j 
on date one, and if f represents the total 
number of withdrawals on date one than 
one can have: 
VvfÑ, ry = {r if fÑr < 10 if fÑr ≥ 1 (98) 
And if: 
Vrf, r = max{6
6'ä
ä , 0}(99) 
The first best equilibrium is such thatÊ =
â: 
Vrf, r = Vrf, «∗ = 6
h&''∗
h = «rr∗                                                                              
(100) 
So now if r = 1 then we would have 
Vrf, 1 = max{r, 0} = rand the patient 
types of depositors would never have 
incentive to withdraw at period one. To do 
better we need r>1,either way banks would 
never be better than autarky. So when r>1 
there would be a depositor panic and run 
on the bank.  Now if = Ô' , the depositors 
one can expect to withdraw all of their 
deposits at T=1,thus making æ : Ô' , Í= =
0,so now every depositor has incentive to 
join the front of the queue of depositors in 
front of the bank ,in hope one to get his 
money out. So in this equilibrium 
everyone will do the same and some 
depositors will be left empty handed. No 
depositor will get money at T=2.The bank 
thus will have failed. Now, will get back 
shortly the notion that by assumption that 
relative risk aversionâÍ > 1 ,and since 
relative risk aversion always exceeds 1, the 
optimal consumption levels will satisfy 
these conditions: 
c∗ > 1and«rr∗ > Í 
The proof for the last according to the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
 
pru.r < Íu.r 
= 1 ∗ u.1 + ç ∂∂φ
6
ê
φu.φdφ 
= u.1 +  u.φ +6ê
u..φdφ < u.1(101)                
 
Becauseu. > 0 and for all ∀ë −
á44ìì
á4ì > 1.  
 
8. Conclusion  
 
In the late 1970’s most of the economist 
declared as new-classical. It seems that all 
of the best macroeconomics were at new-
classical economics side, Gordon(1990)
19
. 
Yet, Keynesian macroeconomics 
reemerged again. Nowadays, it is proven 
in 1990’s and 2000’s also that the new–
classical macroeconomics prove to be very 
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wrong. Nowadays good guys in economics 
are new-keynesians and not new-classical 
economists. It seems that just when the 
new Keynesian economics was been 
declared dead, the best papers in 
Keynesian economics and in economics in 
general had been written by Keynesian 
economists. Neo-classical synthesis long 
run, might just be too long so government 
and central bank policies are needed.  
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